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HOST COUNTRIES' ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
INTRODUCTION
Substantial changes have occurred with respect to the atti-
tude of host countries toward direct foreign investment in their
respective countries. As Henry King has stated, "New patterns
of control and decontrol appear to be emerging in key areas of the
world . .. ."I The reasons for such new patterns, however, are
varied. Governments have responded to differing forces such as
nationalistic feelings adverse to multinational corporations and
other forms of foreign investment, balance of payments or anti-
trust problems, or, most recently, the accumulation of tremen-
dous "petrodollar" reserves among some member nations of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [hereinafter re-
ferred to as OPEC].
Three basic trends are discernable. First, the traditional
open door policy has been replaced in many developed countries
by restrictions subjecting foreign investors to government regis-
tration and review. Generally, no explicit prohibitions are estab-
lished except in certain sensitive industries. Second, many less
developed countries, either unilaterally or through regional or-
ganizations, have been screening foreign investment, and in addi-
tion have begun to impose rigid rules governing all aspects of
foreign investment in their economies. Third, some developed
and developing nations have been liberalizing their policies to-
ward foreign investment. This note will examine these emerging
attitudes toward foreign investment and analyze their long-range
significance.
I. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
A. The United States
With few exceptions,2 the United States, like most developed
1. King, Foreign Restrictions on US. Investment, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 27, 27 (1973).
2. In the United States, various federal statutes impose restrictions upon incoming
foreign investment in sensitive sectors of the economy which relate to the national defense
or involve the exploitation of certain natural resources. The most important sectors af-
fected are coastwise and freshwater shipping, 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-69 (Supp. V 1975), domes-
tic radio communications, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1970), domestic air transport, 49 U.S.C. §§
1301(13), 1401 (1970), acquisition of federal mineral lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1970), and
hydroelectric power, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970). For a review of United States restrictions,
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countries, has traditionally welcomed foreign investment, and
has created no general obstacles to the entry of such capital into
its domestic economy. The basic policy has been to maintain an
open door to such investment, and to accord foreign investors
treatment equal to that given their domestic counterparts.' In
late 1973, however, a sudden surge of investment from Japan and
Western Europe triggered great public and congressional concern
over the desirability of such an open door policy. An extensive
administrative policy review and a round of congressional hear-
ings were undertaken, resulting in the Foreign Investment Study
Act of 1974.1 Under the provisions of this act, the executive
branch is required to study the scope of foreign investment in the
United States and the adequacy of our current data gathering,
disclosure, and reporting requirements, and to make recommen-
dations to maintain current information on such investment.'
The Act did not, though, in any way change the liberal United
States policy.
8
Following these responses, the intense public interest sub-
sided briefly until reawakened by the dramatic emergence, in
1974, of OPEC as a major factor in the world economy. In light
of OPEC's huge financial capacity to invest in the United States,
the foreign investment issue once again attracted public as well
see Foreign Investment Legislation: Hearings on S. 329, S. 995 and S. 1303 Before the
Subcom. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1975); Comment, Foreign Investment in the United States: Is Amer-
ica for Sale?, 12 Hous. L. REv. 661, 670-71 (1975).
3. Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974: Hearings on S. 3955 Before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Hearings]; Foreign Investment in the
United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 House
Hearings].
4. Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. 78(b) app. (Supp.
V 1975).
5. Id. §§ 5(1), 5(6), 5(11), 5(13), 6(9)-(10).
6. President Ford stated:
As I sign this act, I reaffirm that it is intended to gather information only. It is
not in any sense a sign of change in America's traditional open door policy
toward foreign investment. We continue to believe that the operation of free
market forces will direct worldwide investment flows in the most productive
way. Therefore my Administration will oppose any new restriction on foreign
investment in the United States except where absolutely necessary on national
security grounds or to protect an essential national interest.




as legislative attention. 7 The Ford Administration reacted by con-
ducting another major policy review in early 1975, giving specific
attention to the questions raised by the potential of investment
by OPEC nations."
The 1975 review resulted in three major conclusions regard-
ing the future of United States policy toward foreign investment.'
First, there was no necessity for new legislation to further restrict
foreign investment. Second, legislation may be required to com-
pel the disclosure of beneficial ownership, both domestic and for-
eign, of investments made in nominees' names. Third, existing
practice should be supplemented by administrative action
through the establishment of a high level office to deal with for-
eign investment and an inter-agency Committee on Foreign In-
vestment in the United States. An additional conclusion of the
1975 policy review was that procedures for advance consultation
on significant direct investment should be negotiated with princi-
pal foreign government investors.'0
B. Other Developed Countries
Although the United States has not yet found a need to take
further action in limiting foreign investment, other developed
countries faced with new nationalistic and economic pressures
have taken a more restrictive attitude toward such investment."
Most developed countries maintain some form of registration or
licensing system for foreign investment, and apparently a world-
wide trend in that direction exists. There is a great discrepancy,
however, in the rigor and intensity with which these national
systems are implemented. In some countries screening is essen-
tially a formality and a means to gather data on levels of foreign
activity in the domestic economy. In others, such as Australia
and Canada, the screening process serves as a more rigorous in-
strument for controlling and regulating types and levels of foreign
penetration of the local economy. Their recently passed foreign
7. The public concern led to no fewer than fifteen proposed bills and two executive
orders. For a review of some of the bills, see Note, U.S. Regulation of Foreign Investment:
Current Developments and the Congressional Response, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 633-46
(1975).
8. See Niehuss, Foreign Investment in the United States: A Review of Government
Policy, 16 id. 65, 81-83 (1976).
9. Id. at 82.
10. Id.
11. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 24.
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investment laws do not make outright prohibitions of foreign
investment in specific sectors, though they do make it possible for
screening administrators to discourage many types of commercial
activity in sensitive areas."2
1. Australia
The Australian government has traditionally held the view
that it generally should not attempt to legislate in the field of
foreign investment. Nevertheless, due to the huge flow of foreign
capital into Australia between 1970 and 1972,11 the government
reversed its liberal policy. Until then, foreign capital had usually
matched the deficit of the current balance of payments account,
thus adding to the resources available in the economy. 4 However,
when the Australian dollar became undervalued, in 1970-71, "the
flow of foreign capital had almost the sole effect of increasing the
international reserves ..... " In other words, the Australian
government believed that the influx of foreign capital brought
with it costs without adding to the resources available for use in
the economy anything more than an increase in international
reserves.
The current concern in both the Australian federal and state
governments is to prevent further unrestricted foreign encroach-
ment and at the same time encourage the development of
domestically-owned industries. With the exception of certain pol-
icies against foreign control of banking, broadcasting, and trans-
portation,'6 foreign corporate regulation, including reporting and
disclosure requirements, had been under the jurisdiction of the
states. Only recently, with the passing of the Companies Act,'7
has the national government extended its foreign investment re-
12. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 391. In Canada, section 2(e) of the Foreign
Investment Review Act, Can. Stat., ch. 46 (1974), requires that the Minister of Industry,
Trade, and Commerce consider the compatability of the acquisition or establishment of
a Canadian business with national industrial and economic policies. There is a long
history of Canadian attempts to preclude foreign control of key sectors of the national
economy by limiting foreign ownership. See generally Franck & Gudgeon, Canada's For-
eign Investment Control Experiment: The Law, the Context and the Practice, 50 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 76, 93 (1975).
13. Comment, Foreign Investment Restrictions: Defending Economic Sovereignty in
Canada and Australia, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 345, 361 (1973).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 351.
17. The Companies (Foreign Take-Overs) Act of 1972, Austl. Acts ch. 46 (1972), as
amended by Austl. Acts ch. 46 (1973).
[Vol. 11:2
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strictions to manufacturing and industrial corporate develop-
ment.
The Companies Act applies to those situations in which the
Minister appointed pursuant to the Act believes that foreigners
are in a position to "exercise effective control of the company"
when "that control would be contrary to the national interest."",
It appears that "[take over proposals will almost inevitably be
regarded as against national interest if they are directed towards
an economically strategic industry leader, or are so large that
they would significantly affect the relative balance of Australian
and foreign ownership and control of the industry concerned."' 9
If the takeover is not directed at a strategic company, a determi-
nation will be made as to whether the takeover would lead to such
economic benefits as to justify the increased degree of foreign
control in that industry. 0
The Act is concerned primarily with target companies, hav-
ing assets of over one million dollars, that would come under the
control of a foreign interest through the exchange or sale of stock
shares.2' If a foreign person or group gains 15% or more, or a
combined overseas interest acquires 40% or more, of the voting
power in a corporation, it will be presumed that effective control
of the company has passed from Australian to foreign hands.22 In
such a case, the Act enables the government to issue an order
prohibiting the further acquisition of shares by foreigners. 23
Thus, the Companies Act grants the government broad au-
thority to prohibit the takeover of domestic companies by foreign
interests. Such measures are discretionary, though, and a deter-
mination of the merits of each takeover may be made on a case-
by-case basis.
2. Canada
While most developed countries continue to favor the inflow
of foreign investment, Canada, even more than Australia, has
18. Id. § 13(2)(b).
19. Comment, 14 HAiv. INT'L L.J., supra note 13, at 361.
20. Id.
21. If assets other than shares are involved, the crucial question is whether all or a
substantial part of the assets will be acquired. Comment, 14 H~Aiv. INT'L L.J., supra note
13, at 363.
22. The Companies (Foreign Take-Overs) Act of 1972, Austl. Acts ch. 46, § 11 (1972),
as amended by Austl. Acts ch. 46 (1973).
23. A transfer of control of a corporation from one foreign interest to another is not
subject to review. Id. §§ 13(2)(b)(1), 13(3)(b)(1), 14(1)(a).
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moved from a liberal attitude to one oriented toward reducing the
proportion of foreign investment in its economy.24 Some commen-
tators suggest that the spirit of "economic nationalism" in Can-
ada resembles that of less developed countries.2" Several factors
have apparently contributed to this increased Canadian sensitiv-
ity to foreign investment: the level of foreign investment2" and the
key industries involved;2 the high rate of unemployment in Can-
ada;2 and fear of foreign dominance through foreign takeovers of
Canadian enterprises.Y These factors have stimulated efforts to
halt the takeover of Canadian companies by non-residents " and
to foster greater Canadian ownership and control of business and
industry.3' The Canadians also have revised their foreign invest-
ment tax laws. 2
In 1973 the Canadian Parliament passed the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act 33 which established a procedure for the review
of proposed takeovers by foreign corporations of existing Cana-
dian companies, in order to certify that such takeovers would
24. The assets of non-resident-controlled corporations were estimated to total 56.2
billion Canadian dollars in 1969. This figure represents 24.4% of all corporate assets in
Canada in that year. United States firms accounted for nearly 75% of all foreign-owned
industry. Canada: Investing, Licensing and Trading Conditions Abroad, Bus. INT'L, Mar.
1973, at 3.
25. Martin, Canada: A New Chile in the North?, DuNs REv., June 1973, at 84. See
Cohen, Canada and the United States-Possibilities for the Future, 12 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 196 (1973).
26. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 425. See generally Foreign Investment
Review Act, Can. Stat., ch. 46, § 2 (1974).
27. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 425-26. For example, in 1972, United States
citizens controlled 76% of total assets in the transportation equipment industry; 68% in
the chemical, rubber, petroleum, and coal industries; 66% in the machinery industry; and
57% in the electrical products and metal mining industries. "Canada First"--Meaning for
U.S. Investors, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 11, 1972, at 60.
28. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 426. See Gualtieri, Canada's New Foreign
Investment Policy, 10 TEx. INT'L L.J. 46, 48 (1975).
29. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 426. See generally Foreign Investment
Review Act, Can. Stat., ch. 46, § 2 (1974).
30. The Canadian government experienced stiff public reaction to the attempt by
Prudential Insurance Company to gain control of Canada's second largest finance com-
pany, as well as McGraw Hill's attempted acquisition of Canada's Tyerson Press.
Canada's Closing "Open Door," FORBES, Dec. 1, 1970, at 22, 25. Also, the government
thwarted an attempt by United States interests to take over Denison Mines, a leading
uranium corporation; in another instance, a Canadian purchase was arranged when it
became apparent that Ashland Oil, a United States firm, was seeking control of Home
Oil Company, Limited, a large Canadian firm. Martin, supra note 25, at 90.
31. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 426.
32. Id.
33. Foreign Investment Review Act, Can. Stat., ch. 46 (1974).
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result in significant benefits to Canada. 34 The Act contains cer-
tain limitations. The purchase of government-owned enterprises
is exempt from the review process, 35 as is the takeover of firms
which have gross assets of less than $250,000 and annual gross
revenue of less that $3 million.36
The Act's definition of acquisition of control could prove
troublesome. It states that control is the mere "acquisition of the
shares of the corporation to which are attached voting rights, 3 7
or the acquisition of the property of a Canadian business. Con-
trol will be deemed conclusive if a non-eligible purchaser acquires
more than 50% of the voting shares of a Canadian corporation,
or all or substantially all of the property used in carrying on a
business in Canada. 39 Acquisition of less that 5% of the voting
shares of a public corporation, or less than 20% in the case of a
private corporation, does not in itself constitute control or a cause
for review." Acquisition of between 5% and 50% of the voting
shares in the case of a public corporation, and between 20% and
50% in the case of a private corporation, raises a presumption
that control has been acquired and opens the possibility of re-
view.' Whether control has in fact been acquired, however, must
be determined by the reviewers. This discretionary provision
could result in great confusion for the investor.
Portfolio-type investments are not affected by the Act. A
non-eligible person who would be presumed to acquire control of
a corporation may rebut the presumption by establishing that
another person or group controls the corporation, and that the
investor has not used nor does intend to use the shares which he
has acquired to exercise control over the corporation.2
34. Id. §§ 3(1)(a), 4(1), 5(1).
35. Id. § 5(1)(a)(b).
36. Id. § 5(1)(c). The Act prevents the circumventing of these limits through the
division of large corporations into smaller ones prior to takeover. Aggregation of the gross
assets and gross revenue is required of any enterprises associated "by reason of interrela-
tionship of management, ownership or financial affairs. . . unless. . . the Minister [of
Industry, Trade, and Commerce] is satisfied that the separate existence of the associated
enterprises . . . is not for any purpose [of avoiding] .. .the provisions of the law." Id.
§ 5(2).
37. Id. § 3(3)(a)(i)(A).
38. Id. § 3(3)(a)(i)(B).
39. Id. § 3(3)(d).
40. Id. § 3(3)(c).
41. Id.
42. See generally id. § 3(2)-(9).
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C. The European Economic Community
The European Economic Community [hereinafter referred
to as EEC] has become concerned about changes in market con-
ditions and the reduction of competition within the Common
Market. There have been three major reasons for this concern:
fear of the growing strength of multinational corporations; the
inability of European firms to benefit from the European market
to the same degree as non-European firms; and the rising rate of
inflation." To deal with these factors, the EEC has proposed a
European Company Law" to encourage the growth and merger of
small and medium-sized European firms. 5 For the moment, the
EEC has employed its antitrust authority in the absence of over-
all policy direction toward foreign investment.46
In 1957 the EEC nations signed the Treaty of Rome47 in order
to chart a common economic policy, including a uniform ap-
proach to antitrust. The EEC Commission's power over antitrust
activities is derived from Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, which
prohibits "an improper exploitation by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position within the Common Market."4 Article 85
43. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 419.
44. On June 30, 1970, the European Economic Community [hereinafter cited as
EEC] Commission submitted to the Council of Ministers of the EEC a proposal for the
establishment of European public stock corporations to be chartered by the EEC.
Proposition de Reglement du Conceil Portant Statut de la Societ6 Anonyme Europtene,
13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 124) 1 (1970), transl. in BULL. E.C., June 24, 1970. These
corporations would be referred to individually as a Societas Europea (S.E.), id. art. 1(1),
and would exist alongside national corporations created under member State law. The
final proposal is still in the drafting stage and it should be a few more years before the
Council approves it. Dep't of State Airgram, U.D.E.C.-A-237 (July 31, 1974).
45. Jones, A Primer on Production and Dominant Positions Under EEC Competition
Law, 7 INT'L LAw. 612, 632 (1973).
46. Moss, The European Community Still Has No Competition Policy, 16 ANTITRUST
BULL. 443 (1971).
47. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
48. The following criteria constitute "improper exploitation" under Article 86:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling
prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prej-
udice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract subject to the acceptance,
by a party, of additional supplies which, by their nature . . . have no connec-
tions with the subject of such contract.
EEC Treaty, art. 86.
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prohibits all agreements and concerted practices which are de-
signed to restrict or distort competition within the Common Mar-
ket, or which have that effect.
During the early years of the Common Market little empha-
sis was placed upon antitrust regulation. 9 Recently the EEC
Commission" has moved toward a more rigorous antitrust posi-
tion.5 1 Some observers believe that the emerging EEC antitrust
policy may hinder the operations of foreign-owned (especially
American) multinational corporations operating within the Com-
mon Market. Recent rulings of the EEC Commission have not
been directed specifically against foreign investment, but at mar-
ket conditions arising out of the growth of regional commerce as
a consequence of the establishment of the EEC.52 Nevertheless,
acquisitions and mergers by foreign investors constitute a major
element of these changes in European commerce, and therefore
the decision in Europeballage Corporation v. Commission of the
European Communities53 [hereinafter referred to as Continental
Can] may be of concern to foreign investors. 4 That holding evi-
dences the Commission's recent concern with preventing compa-
nies from obtaining a dominant position in the European econ-
omy and the potential for increased restrictions on foreign inves-
tors operating within the Common Market.
In Continental Can, the Commission charged that the Conti-
nental Can Company violated Article 86 by creating a quasi-
monopoly in the metal container business through a series of
mergers. 5 The company countered that the Treaty of Rome was
49. Moss, supra note 46. See also Waelbroeck, Recent Developments and Further
Prospects of the Common Market, 1 GA. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1970).
50. Article 155 of the EEC Treaty establishes the European Economic Commission,
which is empowered to investigate antitrust matters. While serving as an administrative
arm of the EEC, the Commission also has quasi-judicial powers and may issue binding
decisions which are subject to review only by the Court of Justice, the highest tribunal in
the Common Market. See generally EEC Treaty, supra note 47, art. 167.
51. For a more general review of EEC antitrust policy, see Hawk, Antitrust in the
EEC-The First Decade, 41 FoRDHAM L. REv. 229 (1972).
52. E.g., Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Comm'n of the European Com-
munities, [1973] Comm. MKT. L.R. D.50 (Commercial Solvents Case); Cooperative Ver-
eniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Comm'n of the European Communities, [1973] COMM. MKT.
L.R. D.65 (Sugar Cartel Case); Re Pittsburgh Coming Europe, 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No.
L 272) 35 (1972), [1973] Comm. MKT. L.R. D.2.
53. [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, [1973] CoMM. MKT. L.R. 199.
54. See Adler & Belman, Antimerger Enforcement in Europe-Trends and Prospects,
8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. DEv. 31, 43 (1973).
55. In February 1969, Continental Can Corporation acquired a majority of outstand-
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not intended to apply to mergers, and, furthermore, that Article
86 merely prohibits the abuse of a dominant position; dominance
itself is implicitly permitted. In reviewing the Commission's deci-
sion, the European Court of Justice first decided that Article 86
applies not only to behavior which has a direct detrimental effect
on the market, but also to changes in a corporation's internal
structure which indirectly create a deleterious effect on compa-
nies within the Common Market. Internal changes, such as merg-
ers, increase both the size and economic power of a firm and
therefore could have an external effect on the market.
At the same time, the Court declined to discuss the meaning
of the phrase "exploitation . . . of a dominant position" in the
market, as used in Article 86.56 The Court accepted the Commis-
sion's view that an abuse occurs where an enterprise "in a domi-
nant position strengthens such position in such a way that the
degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition,
i.e. that only undertakings remain in the market whose behavior
depends on the dominant one."57 However, the Court stated that
where the elimination of competition is alleged, the Commission
must "state legally sufficient reasons or, at least, had to prove
that competition was so essentially affected that the remaining
competitors could no longer provide a sufficient counterweight.""8
The Court determined that in this action the Commission had not
proved that the remaining producers of light metal containers for
the general market did not offer a counterbalance to the merged
enterprise. 9
Several observations may be made in the light of Continental
Can and the Court of Justice action. The Court's decision re-
ing shares in Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke AG, a German manufacturer of light metal
containers. By the end of 1969, Continental Can held 85.8% of its subsidiaries' shares.
Desiring to further increase its European holdings, Continental Can merged with its Dutch
licensee, Thomassen and Drijver-Verblijfa N.V., also a manufacturer of light metal con-
tainers. In February 1970, Continental Can established the Europemballage Corporation,
incorporated in Delaware as its wholly-owned subsidiary, to which all of Continental Can's
interests in Europe were transferred. [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 218, [1973] CoMM.
MKT. L.R. at 203-05. See Adler & Belman, supra note 54, at 39.
56. It should be noted that in an earlier decision it was decided "that two corporations
which display almost identical market behavior will be treated as a single unit. The size
and market conduct of that unit will then be considered in determining whether the unit
has a dominant position." Comment, Continental Can-New Strength for Common Mar-
ket Anti-Trust, 11 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 227, 239 (1973).
57. [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 245, [1973] COMM. MKT. L.R. at 225.
58. Id. at 246, [1973] Comm. MKT. L.R. at 225.
59. Adler & Belman, supra note 54, at 41.
[Vol. HE :2
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affirmed the right of the EEC Commission to prohibit companies
holding a dominant position from acquiring or merging with other
firms in manners likely to significantly restrict competition, but
it declined to define what in fact constitutes a "dominant posi-
tion" in a market. Therefore a foreign investor is given little direc-
tion as to what degree of control may legally be accumulated in
a particular industry. Though the point where an oligopoly is
prohibited is in question, dominance in the form of a monopoly
may automatically violate Article 86. In the absence of clearer
criteria under Articles 85 and 86, further court tests are likely.
II. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Government constraints on foreign investment have gener-
ally been more extensive in developing countries. Developed
countries frequently monitor foreign investment through registra-
tion and screening requirements which allow the imposition of
restrictions on a case-by-case basis. The trend in the less devel-
oped countries is to provide blanket statutory prohibitions on
certain foreign investment in these countries.
While "[t]he policies of developing countries toward For-
eign Direct Investment range from active recruitment["0 ] to
complete rejection,""1 many developing countries have adopted
strong positions concerning the need to control, or even limit,
foreign investment. Some of those developing nations which offer
special concessions designed to induce the entry of the foreign
investor are reconsidering that approach and contemplating mea-
sures that would limit the scope of foreign investment in particu-
lar industries and restrict the operation of foreign-owned firms."
"Few developing nations place no significant restrictions on for-
eign investment, and a number of [developing countries] have
taken or are contemplating actions to limit it severely. Not con-
tent with restrictions on new projects, several [developing coun-
tries] have resorted to expropriation or forced divestiture of exist-
ing investments . . .- "
Generally, the developing nations are not convinced that
unregulated private foreign investment will be beneficial to their
60. Landau, Direct Foreign Investments in Developing Countries?, 4 J.L. & ECON.
DEv. 182, 182-84 (1969).
61. Ellis, United States Multinational Corporations: The Impact of Foreign Direct
Investment on United States Foreign Relations, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 14 (1973).
62. See generally text accompanying notes 66-95 infra; Epstein, infra note 64.
63. Ellis, supra note 61, at 15.
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interests, a conviction which reflects their historical experiences
and their sensitivity to conditions which might potentially im-
pinge upon their national independence or autonomy." They
hope to reduce the perceived disadvantages of foreign investment
while improving the terms on which they gain access to foreign
technology and the degree to which their citizens benefit from a
foreign investor's activities. 5
A. The Andean Code
1. Background
The trend toward increased regulation of foreign investment
has been particularly strong in Latin America.
The observed trend indicates a rising governmental intervention
through diverse mechanisms, in the affairs of foreign enterprises
in host countries. Such intervention implies an increased preser-
vation of national markets and national economic potential,
with respect to the rest of the world, to fulfill national or subre-
gional development objectives rather than leaving them to the
global policies and objectives of transnational enterprises."6
Probably the most systematic program for regulating and con-
straining foreign investment is that devised in December 1970 by
the signatories67 of the Andean Foreign Investment Code"8
[hereinafter referred to as Andean Code], a common program for
the treatment of foreign capital, trademarks, patents, licenses,
64. Id. For a closer look at one nation's nationalistic trend, see Epstein, Introduction
to Recent Developments in Mexican Law: Politics of Modern Nationalism, 4 DEN. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 1 (1974).
65. See Baranson, Changes in the Investment Climate in Developing Nations, 7
VAND. J. INT'L L. 569; 570 (1974) (discussing investment attitudes in Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, Taiwan, Korea, and Mexico).
66. Vaitos, Foreign Investment Practices and Economic Development in Latin
America, 7 J. WoaLD TRADE L. 640, 640 (1973).
67. The original signatories to the Treaty establishing the Andean Code were Bolivia,
Chile, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru. Commission of the Cartegena Agreements, Dec. No.
24, Dec. 31, 1970, as amended June 24 and July 17, 1971, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEGAL
MArs. 126 (1972). Venezuela joined the group in 1974. Andean Commission-Venezuela:
Final Act of the Negotiation on the Entry of Venezuela into the Cartegena Agreement,
Feb. 13, 1973, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATs. 344 (1973).
Chile recently withdrew from the group. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1976, at 17, col. 1. For
a criticism of the Andean Pact after Chile's withdrawal see N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, §
4, at 3, col. 1.
68. Commission of the Cartegena Agreements, Dec. No. 24, Dec. 31, 1970, as
amended June 24 and July 17, 1971, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 126 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Andean Code].
[Vol. 111: 2
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and royalties. The six signatories acted, in large measure, upon
an asserted conviction that their national sovereignty was being
eroded through dependence upon economic decisions made by
foreign companies and governments." The Andean Code was de-
signed to limit foreign influence in the domestic economies of
member States, and to promote sound development and national
economic autonomy in the region.
7
1
The Code is based upon a view of foreign investment widely
subscribed to in Latin America. First, it is assumed that domina-
tion of certain strategic economic sectors by foreign investors lim-
its the ability of the host government to pursue an autonomous
national economic policy.71 Second, it is believed that many for-
eign investments compete with, rather than complement, domes-
tic enterprises, and that takeovers of local firms by foreign inves-
tors damage a country's long-term economic strength and growth
potential.72 Third, it is felt that many foreign investors engage in
restrictive business practices. 3 The provisions of the Andean
Code purport to limit these negative effects of foreign investment
while capitalizing on its positive contributions. The Andean Code
seeks "to give preference in the economic development of the
[Andean] subregion to authentically national capital and enter-
prises of the Member Countries." 4 To accomplish this goal, the
Code attempts to channel foreign investment into forms which
encourage transfers of technological advances to local entrepre-
neurs, thus furthering the expansion, diversification, and special-
ization of local industry, and increasing local employment and
job skills.75 However, the remainder of the Code appears to be
counterproductive to an increase in foreign capital needed to fi-
nance the new techologies.
69. See Milenky, From Integration to Developmental Nationalism: The Andean
Group 1965-71, INTER-AM. ECON. AFF., Winter 1971, at 77.
70. Id.
71. Milenky, Developmental Nationalism in Practice: The Problems and Progress of
the Andean Group, INTER-AM. ECON. AFF., Spring 1973, at 49, 57.
72. Rogers, United States Investment in Latin America: A Critical Appraisal, 11 VA.
J. INT'L L. 246, 249 (1971).
73. Shill, The Mexican and Andean Investment Codes: An Overview and
Comparison, 6 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 437, 438 (1974).
74. Rep. of the Special Latin American Coordinating Comm. on the Consensus of
Vifia del Mar, May 17, 1969, reproduced in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 129 (1969).
75. Comment, The Multinational Enterprise in the Context of Latin American
Economic Integration: The Andean Agreement Model, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 245, 251
(1973). Nevertheless, the remainder of the Code appears to be counterproductive to this
goal because foreign capital, necessary to finance the new technologies, is discouraged.
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2. Provisions of the Code
The Code seeks to direct foreign investment into sectors not
in competition with domestic industry and to expand domestic
participation in the ownership of foreign firms. It stipulates that
all foreign investment shall be screened by national governments,
and that no additional investment will be permitted in sectors
already adequately covered by existing enterprises." A schedule
is provided for phased divestiture by existing foreign investors"
until ultimately host country enterprises are at least fifty-one
percent owned by local investors.
7 8
The Andean Code contains a series of prohibitions and con-
trols over activities of foreign enterprises. 79 National governments
are authorized to oversee and control the prices of intermediate
products furnished by foreign investors and/or by suppliers of
foreign technology." Loans from foreign firms to domestic enter-
prises must be authorized and registered, and global limits on
such indebtedness may be established.81 Interest rates on loans
between parent firms and their local subsidiaries are regulated
and controlled by host governments. 82 Official approval is needed
for contracts importing technology, patents, or trademarks, and
many restrictive clauses often found in such contracts are prohib-
ited. 3 No royalties may be paid by a foreign-owned subsidiary for
76. Andean Code, supra note 68, arts. 2, 3.
77. Id. ch. II. The Code prohibits the establishment of foreign investments in the
public services (utilities, transportation, and communications) sector or in finance, insur-
ance, advertising, publishing, or marketing enterprises of any kind. Id. arts. 41-43. Exist-
ing foreign investments in the closed sectors were required to have been converted into
national enterprises with at least 80% local participation by July 1974. Id. Furthermore,
the exploration for and exploitation of all minerals is reserved exclusively to national
enterprises. Concessions may not be granted to foreign enterprises after July 1981, and
any concession granted may not exceed twenty years. Id. art. 40. Foreign participation in
petroleum and natural gas exploitation should be through contracts with State enterprises
of each country. Id. The exclusions from specific sectors may be waived, however, by a
unilateral act of any country which feels that specific circumstances merit such an excep-
tion from the Code. Id. art. 44.
78. Id. art. 28.
79. While the Andean Code is almost uniformly applicable to foreign investments in
all member countries, there are wide variations among those countries in the strictness
and extensiveness with which the provisions are applied. See Milenky, supra note 71, at
57.
80. Andean Code, supra note 68, art. 6(c).
81. Id. art. 14.
82. Id. arts. 14, 16.
83. Id. arts. 18, 19, 20, 25. Specifically prohibited are obligations to purchase capital
goods, inputs, or services in exchange for use of a patent or trademark; clauses permitting
the seller of the technology to fix sale or resale prices of the goods produced; clauses
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intangible technological contributions furnished by its parent
company or another of its affiliates.84
The Code imposes a number of constraints on capital trans-
fers and profit repatriations.85 Foreign investors are guaranteed
the right to repatriate their invested capital in convertible cur-
rency when shares, participations, or rights are sold to national
investors or when the local firm is liquidated, 6 provided all ap-
plicable taxes are paid. 7 Reinvestment of profits must be author-
ized by national governments, although the governments of mem-
ber countries may allow such reinvestment without prior authori-
zation if it does not exceed five percent of the company's capital
in any one year."
The Andean Code has had a great impact upon other devel-
oping countries. In Latin America, Argentina has instituted poli-
cies similar to those of the Andean Code.89 Mexico, which has
imposed constraints upon foreign investment since 1938, and in
some respects pioneered policies which were later implemented
by the Andean Code,"0 has expanded its system of regulation and
limitation on investment in light of the Andean Code experi-
ence.' In Asia, Thailand and the Philippines have announced
similar policies requiring divestitures and reduced operations by
foreigners in certain sectors of their economies.12 Robert Gardner
indicates that this sentiment is growing in Africa where "more
and more African countries want to achieve accelerated economic
restricting the volume and structure of production; obligations to pay royalties for patents
and trademarks not used; clauses prohibiting the use of competitive technologies; clauses
establishing a purchase option in favor of the supplier of the technology, or obligating the
purchaser to transfer to the owner any inventions or improvements discovered; and clauses
limiting exports or sales abroad of products manufactured on the basis of the technology
or with the licensed trademark. Id. art. 20.
84. Id. art. 21.
85. Authorization for such transfers must be granted by national regulatory boards,
id. art. 6(d), and up to 14% profit on invested capital may be approved annually for
repatriation from verified earnings of direct foreign investments. Id. art. 37.
86. Id. art. 7.
87. Id. art. 10.
88. Id. arts. 12, 13.
89. Ellis, supra note 61, at 15.
90. Shill, supra note 73, at 465.
91. Ellis, supra note 61, at 15. See generally Miranda, Foreign Companies Investing
and Doing Business in Mexico-Nationalization, 28 Bus. LAw. 1217, 1223-34 (1973).
92. Id. See Comment, Foreign Investment in Thailand: The Effect of Recent
Legislation, 3 DEN. J. INT'L L. 293 (1973); Evangelista, Republic Act No. 1180 and Foreign
Investment in the Philippines: A Dilemma of Economic Nationalism, 3 J.L. & EcoN. Day.
60 (1968).
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and social growth in their own policies."' Limitations on equity
investment and pressure toward disinvestment and regulated
continued presence have been the result, " particularly in Mo-
rocco and Ghana. "
B. The United Nations
The trend in less developed countries toward limiting foreign
investment either generally or in key industries, through restric-
tive policies or through expropriation, has received support and
a measure of international approbation through recent actions of
the United Nations General Assembly. That body, for the first
time in its history, has attempted to establish guidelines to gov-
ern international economic relations.
A special session, convened primarily in response to the large
increase by OPEC in the price of petroleum products,96 met be-
tween April 9 and May 2, 1974. Two documents of major import-
ance were produced: the Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order"7 and theProgramme of Ac-
tion on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order. 8 As a result of the work of the special session, the question
of a new international economic order was placed on the agenda
of the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session." A further
important resolution entitled the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States " was adopted at that session.
These three documents are clearly intended to be normative
in character and are expected to have an important impact on
future foreign investment policies. 1°1 The documents are prime
93. Garber, Foreign Capital In Developing Africa, CONF. BD. REC., Nov. 1973, at 39,
41.
94. Id.
95. Ellis, supra note 61, at 15.
96. White, A New International Economic Order,'24 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 542, 542
(1975).
97. G.A. Res. 3201, 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No., 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974), reprinted in 68 AMER. J. INT'L L. 799 (1974).
98. G.A. Res. 3202, 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATs. 720 (1974).
99. It is significant that all four heads of state who addressed the Assembly during
that session (President Ford of the United States, President Leone of Italy, Prime Minister
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, and Prime Minister Whitlam of
Australia) placed considerable emphasis on this aspect of the United Nations' work. Their
comments are summarized in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Oct. 1974, at 13-18 (1974).
100. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974),
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. (1975).
101. Paragraph 7 of the Declaration states: "This Declaration on the Establishment
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examples of the new militancy at the United Nations of the devel-
oping countries. The Declaration and Programme, viewed to-
gether, advocate "an equitable sharing of world trade and the
benefits of technology.'
'0 2
The Charter clearly aims at changing the structure of the
world economy and not merely at reforming the present system.
Article 2 enunciates perhaps the most controversial provisions of
the Charter with respect to foreign investment. That Article
states that each country has full permanent sovereignty over all
its wealth, natural resources, and economic activities and has the
right to regulate and supervise transnational corporations. For-
eign property may be nationalized, and compensation may be
determined by the laws and courts of the host country."3 In effect,
the Article permits a State to nationalize, expropriate, or transfer
ownership of foreign property within its borders and pay any
compensation it deems appropriate, or no compensation at all.
Although nationalization of foreign-owned property, has occurred
for many years"4 and has even been publicly acknowledged by the
United States' 5 and, by other nations,' it had never before been
of a New International Economic Order shall be one of the most important bases of
economic relations between all peoples and all nations." G.A. oRes. 3201, 6 Special Sess.
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 4, at 5,. U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
102. White, supra note 96, at 543. The Declaration and Programme of Action were
adopted without a vote, but this cannot be regarded as being equivalent to unanimity.
Five countries-the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and
the United Kingdom-were so concerned with some of the ideas incorporated in the
documents that they annexed reservations to them. U.N. Doc. A/PU .2229, at 41-50 (1974).
(United States); U.N. Doc. A/PU .2229, at 51-57 (1974) (Federal Republic of Germany);
U.N. Doc. A/PU .2229, at 73-85 (19741 (France); U.N. Doc.-A/PU .2230, at 17-22 (1974)
(Japan); U.N. Doc. A/PU .2231, at 12-18 (1974) (United Kingdom). Thereservations are
reproduced in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATs. 744, 749, 753, 759, and-762 (1974).
103. Article 2 declares that each State has the right
[tlo nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which
case appropriate compensation 'hould be paid by the State adopting such mea-
sures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstan-
ces that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of com-
pensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law
of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually
agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis
of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free
choice of means.
Id. art. 2.
104. White, supra note 96, at 544.
105. See Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, Feb.
2, 1972, reprinted in [1972] PuB. PAPERS 194, 263.
106. Developed nations expressed their views on expropriation in the United Nations
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stated as an international right.
As ultimately approved by the General Assembly, the
Charter represents the widest possible measure of agreement on
the issues with which it deals. The Charter "has been cited by
some as a 'revolutionary' document which will transform the en-
tire structure of global interrelationships," while "[o]thers have
maligned it for contributing to the era of confrontation between
nations."'' 7 Some commentators, however, subscribe to neither
view, but believe the Charter is the first step in a process which
"will lead to a more balanced international system."'0 8
HIL. - COUNTERTREND
While many countries have imposed or are considering im-
posing restrictions on foreign investment, a countertrend also ex-
ists. Several countries that previously maintained strict controls
and limits on foreign investment are now liberalizing their rules
and permitting expanded foreign economic activity within their
domestic economies.
For example, in Spain' 9 and France,"10 government policies
which inhibited foreign investment have been relaxed. After a
period in the mid-1960's of sharp resistance to foreign, particu-
larly American, investment, the French now welcome or even
solicit most types of foreign participation in their domestic econ-
omy. ' In Spain, pre-investment screening has been made less
rigorous: in most industries a foreigner may now purchase as
much as fifty percent of a Spanish firm provided he merely noti-
fies the government of his actions."
2
A. Japan
One of the seemingly greatest relaxations of restrictions on
foreign investment has occurred in Japan. Unlike most developed
General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A.
Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 11, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963).
107. Rozental, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and The New
International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 310, 321 (1976).
108. Id.
109. See Allen, Liberalised Investment Laws in Spain, 119 SOLICITERS' J. 855 (1975).
110. Torem & Craig, Developments in the Control of Foreign Investments in France,
70 MIcH. L. REv. 285 (1971).
111. While not prohibiting such investment, the French government remains sensi-
tive to foreign acquisitions of existing firms in technologically advanced sectors and ac-
quisitions which permit an entire industry to fall under foreign control. Id. at 311-15.
112. King, supra note 1, at 29.
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countries, Japan, until recently, has had a very complex formula
for screening foreign investment. Japan's basic attitude had been
that foreign investors attempt to dominate Japanese markets and
should be permitted to enter only under strict surveillance. 13
During the early 1960's, Japan began negotiations leading to
its entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development' [hereinafter referred to as OECD]. Within that
framework, Japan was to assume at least the moral obligation to
pursue efforts to "maintain and extend the liberalization of capi-
tal movements.""' 15 A number of factors, including the Japanese
entrance into American markets, the 1953 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and
Japan,"" and pressure by OECD, resulted in the relaxation of
foreign investment restrictions in Japan between 1967 and 1971."
' 7
Nevertheless, "[1]iberalization has been accompanied at every
instance by countermeasures designed to limit the ability of for-
eign investors to make serious inroads into the control of Japanese
Industry.""'
In May 1973, Japan introduced even more liberal rules re-
garding foreign investment. The new rules give foreign investors
automatic approval to take 100% equity in new ventures estab-
lished in most industries."' Foreign investment is prohibited in
113. Pearl, Liberalization of Capital in Japan-Part , 13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 59, 59
(1972), citing G. ALLEN, JAPAN'S PLACE IN PACIFIC TRADE STRATEGY 27, 27 (1968).
114. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891.
115. Id., art. 2(d).
116. Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
117. Four rounds of liberalization were announced by the Japanese Cabinet. The first
was announced in June 1967, the second in March 1969, the third in September 1970 and
the fourth in August 1971. The basic formula
established three categories of commercial activity or business lines. In the first
two categories, applications for foreign investment acquisitions of up to one
hundred percent and up to fifty percent ownership, respectively, would be
"automatically" validated if a number of stipulated requirements were met.
These requirements varied depending upon the category. The third list or cate-
gory consisted of those business lines in which foreign investment applications
would be reviewed on a case by case basis. [Under the capital liberalization
program,] for the first time, foreign investors were given prior notice of those
businesses in which proposed foreign investments meeting stipulated criteria
would receive government approval.
Hartman, Japanese Foreign Investment Regulation: Semantics and Reality, 18 N.Y.L.F.
355, 363 (1973).
118. Pearl, Liberalization of Capital in Japan-Part I, 13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 59, 60
(1972).
119. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 95.
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the nuclear energy, power and light, gas supply, aircraft manu-
facturing, and armaments and explosives industries; it is limited
to a maximum of 50% in mining and in retail chain store opera-
tions involving more than eleven stores.'20 In primary activities
related to agriculture, forestry and fisheries, petroleum refining
and marketing, and leather products manufacturing, foreign in-
vestment continues to be subject to case-by-case approval.'2 '
The 1973 measures also changed the rules for acquiring eq-
uity in an existing Japanese business. In the past, a single foreign
investor who wished to participate in the management of a Japa-
nese firm could not receive automatic approval for an investment
exceeding 10% ownership. Moreover, total equity held by all for-
eigners sharing in management control through purchase of stock
was limited to 25%. These limits now apply only to the five indus-
tries mentioned above as exceptions to the 100% ownership re-
quirements. In certain specified industries, such as banking and
public utilities, the acceptable percentage is reduced to 15% of
the total outstanding shares. No other industries are restricted,
providing the stock acquisition does not constitute a takeover
attempt against management's wishes.
12
1
On its face, the May 1973 liberalization appears to open the
door to foreign investors, who should enjoy roughly the same free-
dom to operate in Japan as they enjoy in European countries.
Nevertheless, observers are unsure whether the automatic ap-
proval process will proceed smoothly,12 particularly since the sys-
tem still requires that foreign investors have their proposals vali-
dated by the relevant ministers, which may result in continued
delays.' 24 "Although the Japanese government has widely pro-
120. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 448.
121. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 95. One exception occurs in the area of
processed cheese manufacturing, which is open to 100% foreign equity ownership, pro-
vided domestic cheese accounts for more than one-third of the raw materials used. 1974
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 448.
122. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 450. Foreign investors may acquire stock
of an existing firm only upon adoption of an affirmative resolution by the board of direc-
tors. This was deemed necessary to prevent forcible foreign takeovers of Japanese firms.
Note, The Fifth Liberalization of Capital Movements Into Japan, 6 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 279, 285-87 (1974).
123. "Despite four rounds of capital liberalization . . . the restrictive policy of the
government concerning foreign investment still stands." Vaughan, Introduction to Joint
Venturing in Japan, 6 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 178, 178 (1974).
124. Restrictive criteria still must be met if a proposed equity acquisition is to qualify
for "automatic" approval. They are as follows: the proposed equity acquisition must
pertain to a newly established enterprise and not to an existing enterprise; the acquisition
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claimed that true liberalization of capital has arrived in Japan,
it is evident from the analysis of capital liberalization that the
government continues to maintain a conscious policy of limiting
inward foreign direct investment, especially as to working control
of enterprises within Japan. 1 2 Thus, although Japan's policy has
been cited as a countertrend to the imposition of ever-increasing
restrictions by many other developed countries, there is evidence
to support the contention that the effect of this liberalization
might not be as far-reaching as these new policies facially purport
to be.
B. Chile
As previously discussed, a countertrend to the restrictive at-
titudes toward foreign investment exists in many developed coun-
tries. The recent withdrawal of Chile from the Andean Code1 26
appears to lend support to the belief that such a countertrend now
exists in developing nations.
Chile exressed its dissatisfaction with the Andean Code in
August 1976, when it declined to ratify a modification of the Code
which had been proposed by the other members. The Chilean
Ambassador to the United States stated that Chile views the
Code as being "detrimental to the inflow of badly needed foreign
capital. It has severely diminished the region's magnetism for the
foreign investor because it imposes limits and ceilings which do
not exist on other continents."12
Chile's unsuccessful implementation of the Code can only be
understood by tracing the political and economic unrest in the
State. 26 The Allende government increased the nation's foreign
may not have a detrimental effect on Japanese interests; contributions by the Japanese
shareholders, or property agreed to be transferred from an existing company after estab-
lishment of the new company, will be limited to immovable properties; the new enterprise
may not acquire from an existing company or business an assignment of property to be
continually used for business, nor may it merge with an existing company immediately
after its establishment; at least fifty percent of the shareholders must be Japanese engaged
in the same line of business, one of whom must hold at least one-third of the total
outstanding shares of the new company; the ratio of the Japanese elected as directors must
equal or exceed the shareholding ratio of the non-Japanese shareholders. Hildebrand,
Establishing a Joint Venture Company in Japan: Legal Considerations, 6 CASE W. REs.
J. INT'L L. 199, 213 (1974).
125. Pearl, supra note 118, at 87.
126. See note 67 supra.
127. Address by Manuel Trucco, Chilean Ambassador to the United States, at Center
for Strategic and International Studies (Sept. 13, 1976), at 14 (on file with author).
128. See Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process:
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indebtedness at a rate never before equaled, while savings and
investment rates reached unparalleled lows. Most public funds
available during the Allende regime were utilized for massive
acquisitions, such as the nationalization of the copper mines.
Government expenditures caused shortages in all areas of the
Chilean economy and resulted in a deficit equal to fifty percent
of the level of government spending. In July and August of 1973,
Chile's international reserves were valued at minus $600 mil-
lion.
29
Clearly, Chile's outlook has radically changed with the over-
throw of the Allende government. Chile now feels it must encour-
age investment of international capital into its markets in order
to reverse the economic damage done in recent years. In a State
bulletin, Chile declared its current goals to be: "develop[ing]
external markets in order to increase exports; .. .open[ing] up
to imports from the exterior; .. .substantially reducing tariffs;
...[and] creating attractive conditions for investors."''  The
main thrust of Chile's new policy is felt to be thwarted by the
strictness of the Andean Code, which Chile believes has discour-
aged foreign investors.' 3'
As international economic pressures resulted in an apparent
lessening of restrictions on foreign investment by Japan, so have
economic pressures, due to political instabilities, resulted in the
rejection by Chile of the Andean Code. Thus, the importance of
the countertrend should not be overemphasized since it has, in
certain cases, arisen in unique factual situations.
IV. ANALYSIS
Foreign countries have implemented several types of legisla-
tion which affect foreign investment. Clear patterns of national
and regional response emerge with regard to different aspects of
foreign investment.
Most countries have some form of registration or licensing
system for foreign investment and the worldwide trend appears
to be toward increasing such restrictions. There is, however,
much diversity in the size of these systems, and in the intensity
with which they are implemented. Of importance in determining
A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 319, 356-57 (1975).
129. Address by Ambassador Trucco, supra note 127, at 9-11.
130. Chile Economic News, May 1976, at 7.
131. Address by Ambassador Trucco, supra note 127.
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the rigor of a country's screening mechanism is the nature of the
national policy goals it pursues.
In developed countries, screening generally gathers the de-
sired information and provides a means to supervise cash inflows
and outflows and, when necessary, to constrain such flows for
balance of payment purposes. '32 The screening process is often
used to limit foreign penetration of the domestic economy in order
to promote national economic sovereignty. Generally, it is the
developing countries which are most notable in exercising this
type of economic nationalism, but to some extent more developed
countries such as Australia, Canada, and Japan have reacted in
a comparable, yet less intensive, manner.
A number of the developing countries believe that the level
of foreign investment in their economies poses such a serious
threat to their national economic autonomy as to merit more
rigorous and extensive action. In these countries, in addition to
the screening and regulation devices, prohibitions and restric-
tions are placed upon foreign investment in specific economic
sectors,'33 although many of the most developed countries avoid
such constraints.
In addition to laws which close or restrict entry by foreign
investors to some sectors of their domestic economies, host coun-
tries have attempted to regulate the impact of foreign investment
on their systems through rules which regulate the operations of
foreign firms and prohibit certain business practices which the
host country perceives to be undesirable.' 3 Two main types of
constraints are the control of technology transfers and the control
of acquisitions of domestic enterprises.
Regulation of technology has two aspects. Some countries
wish to make companies increase the amount of research and
development work done within their borders rather than at head-
132. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, screening is essentially a formality
used to gather data on levels of foreign activity in the domestic economy. See 1974 House
Hearings, supra note 3, at 458. In other countries such as Canada, Japan, and the Andean
Code countries, the screening process is a more rigorous instrument for controlling and
regulating types and levels of foreign penetration of the local economy.
133. The Andean Code, for example, prohibits foreign investment in public utilities,
transportation, communication, finance, insurance, advertising, marketing, and publish-
ing. Andean Code, supra note 24, arts. 42, 43. In many less developed countries, the
mineral industry is considered fundamentally important to economic development, and
foreign investment is increasingly prohibited and divestiture required in this industry.
Landau, supra note 60, at 191.
134. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 393.
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quarters offices, in order to strengthen the host country's techni-
cal capacity. 3 5 Others wish to regulate the conditions under
which they acquire access to foreign technology, in order to im-
prove the terms of access and reduce perceived social and eco-
nomic costs associated with the importation of technologies from
foreign sources. '
In general, host countries find foreign takeovers of domestic
firms distasteful and provide for controls on foreign acquisition
of domestic firms. While it is often true that the takeover of an
older and less efficient firm by a more dynamic or more soundly
financed foreign firm may yield significant benefits for a host
country, the latter often prefers the creation of a new domestic
operation. In a sense, however, regulation of foreign takeovers and
acquisitions may also result as a response to changed market
conditions and an effort at antitrust regulation of conditions
which have been altered by the activity of the foreign investor.
Such a response has taken place in the European Common
Market due to changes taking place in the Western European
economy. In recent years, the Commission of the EEC has moved
to tighten enforcement of its rules on mergers and market domi-
nance. ' In the Continental Can decision, the Commission ruled
and the European Court of Justice agreed that a merger could
lead to a prohibited abuse of dominant position in a market. This
ruling will undoubtedly inhibit mergers between powerful
foreign-owned enterprises; the uncertainty concerning what con-
stitutes "dominant position" may deter potential foreign mergers
with existing European firms.'38
CONCLUSION
Recent developments in the United Nations graphically
135. For example, the Canadian government conducts an official program to encour-
age the expansion of indigenous research and development.
136. See, e.g., Law No. 5772, Code of Industrial Property, [1971] ColegAo (Brazil);
Law on Registration of Contracts and Agreements Regarding the Transfer of Technology
(Mexico), translated in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 421 (1973); Law Establishing a National
Register of License and Know-How Agreements, [1971] A Anuario (Argentina).
137. See note 52 supra.
138. In the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, national laws also
constrain mergers between large and dominant enterprises. Both countries provide for
screening by their monopoly commissions or cartel authority of such acquisitions. The
Germans prohibit all but exceptional mergers and acquisitions when the parties constitute
one-third of the market or when the industry is highly oligopolistic. 1974 House Hearings,
supra note 3, at 397.
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demonstrate that the traditional belief that the free flow of capi-
tal is the means by which the operating efficiency of the world
economy may be maximized, is being seriously scrutinized on a
global, as well as regional, basis. While it is generally agreed that
foreign investment which introduces new capital and technology
into a host country is an important means of increasing national
living standards, a definite trend exists in developed as well as
developing countries to impose some type of restriction upon in-
coming investment.
Host countries perceive the dangers of this investment in
several different forms which can be reduced to a common de-
nominator: a challenge to national sovereignty. The concept of
sovereignty includes the ability of the host country to shape its
policy objectives-economic, political, and social. Direct invest-
ment by foreigners is seen as a challenge to this sovereignty by
potentially circumventing or subverting national policies with
respect to issues such as employment, prices, regional develop-
ment, market competition, research and development, and for-
eign trade.
The trend toward a nationalistic outlook has been imple-
mented in different countries in various ways. The degree to
which this outlook surfaces in a country's foreign investment
policy is directly correlated with the perceived threat of such
investment to its national autonomy and its ability to control
economic forces vital to national development and power.
Howard B. Berke
1977]
